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2 
other named defendants will sometimes be referred to 
herein as "protesting motor carriers" or "defendants". 
The respective plaintiffs herein will be referred to as 
"Mary A. Murphy" and "Pickering Transfer Company, 
Inc." and will sometimes be collectively referred to as 
"plaintiffs." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action before the Public Service Commis-
sion to transfer a common motor carrier certificate of 
public convenience and necessity and a contract motor 
carrier permit. 
DISPOSITION BY THE PUBLIC 
SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH 
The Commission in its Order under date of October 
30, 1974, denied the application of plaintiffs to transfer 
the contract motor carrier permit of Mary A. Murphy 
to Pickering Transfer Co., Inc. The Commission also 
denied, without prejudice, that part of the application 
by which plaintiffs sought to transfer the separate cer-
tificate of public convenience and necessity. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiffs pray that the Commission's Order 
under date of October 30,1974, be reversed and remanded 
with direction that the transfer application be approved. 
The defendants urge the Court to sustain the Commis-
sion's Order. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mary A. Murphy presently holds operating authority 
from the Commission both as a common and as a con-
tract motor carrier. Even though protestants indicated 
initially they were not challenging the transfer of the 
certificate of public convenience and necessity as alleged 
by plaintiffs on page 5 of their brief, said protestants 
after hearing the evidence, and prior to the conclusion 
of the hearing on April 6, 1973, challenged the fitness 
of plaintiff to hold any authority from the Commission 
and protested the transfer of authority (R. 186,190-191). 
The common motor carrier authority generally au-
thorizes the transportation of general commodities as a 
cartage carrier between specified points in Salt Lake and 
Davis Counties, Utah. The contract motor carrier author-
ity of Mary A. Murphy authorizes her to transport com-
modities as follows: 
"Contract Carrier Permit No. 130 
To operate as a contract motor carrier of all 
kinds of personal property including merchan-
dise, machinery, and other property which she 
has occasion to carry in the course of the con-
duct of her said transportation business within 
a 50-mile radius of Salt Lake City, excluding 
pickup and delivery service within the area de-
scribed in Certificate of Convenience and Neces-
sity No. 684" (R. 55). (Emphasis added.) 
The scope of the conitract motor carrier authority 
was recently interpreted by this Court in Murphy v. 
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Public Service Commission, 30 Utah 2d 140, 514 P. 2d 
804 (1973) (R. 85-87). The count did not have before 
it issues involving the transfer of contract carrier permits. 
On February % 1973, an application was filed with 
the Commission by Mary A. Murphy and Pickering 
Transfer Company, Inc. Whereby Piickering Transfer 
Company, Inc. sought to acquire all the operating author-
ity of Mary A. Murphy pursuant to a contract between 
Mary A. Murphy and Max W. Young. Effectively, the 
agreement between Max W. Young and Mary A. Murphy, 
et al., divested Mary A. Murphy, Paul J. Murphy and 
Charles E. Murphy from any interest whatsoever in 
Mary A. Murphy, d.b.a. Pickering Transfer Company 
effective March 1, 1972, From that day forward, the 
said Mary A. Murphy and her sons were insulated against 
liability and deprived of profits. As a amsideration, Mary 
A. Murphy and her two sons, received a down payment 
of $5,000 cash and were entitled to monthly payments 
of $300 each month commencing April 1, 1972, and for 
a period not to exceed 28 months. In addition, a payment 
of $10,000 is due upon final approval of the transfer of 
all authorities. In the event the Commission does not 
approve the transfer of the contraot carrier permit, the 
remaining $10,000 shall not be paid (Ex. 4). Effectively, 
Mary A. Murphy and her sons have been fully paid for 
the certificates of public convenience and necessity and 
equipment. 
The application was duly processed by the Commis-
sion and set for hearing on April 6, 1973 (R. 14). The 
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protesting motor carriers who are now the defendants 
herein appeared at said hearing to contest the transfer 
application ( R 13). 
At the hearing on April 6, 1973, a statement was 
made by the witness Max W. Young as General Man-
ager for Mary A. Murphy that he had read the applica-
tion and that the application stated his testimony (R. 
161). The applicant introduced a profit and loss state-
ment covering the period January 1, 1973 to February 
28,1973, (R. 66), a balance sheet as of February 28,1973, 
(R. 67), and an equipment list (R. 66A). In addition, 
the applicants asked the Commission to take official 
notice of the profit and loss statement filed as a part 
of the annual report of Mary A. Murphy to the Com-
mission for the year 1972 (R. 163). The financial state-
ments and the equipment list represented the financial 
condition and equipment of the transferror Mary A. 
Murphy and not the financial condition or the equipment 
of the transferee, Pickering Transfer Company, Inc. In 
an effort to correct this defect, applicants' counsel asked 
that those exhibits be treated as the pro forma financial 
statements and equipment list for the corporation, Pick-
ering Transfer Company, Inc. Said exhibits were received 
on stipulation of counsel (R. 197). 
No agreement for the purchase and sale between 
Mary A. Murphy and Pickering Transfer Company, Inc. 
was offered in evidence. The only agreement offered 
was a contract of purchase between Max W. Young and 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Mary A. Murphy, which contract was identified as Ex-
hibit 4 (R. 5-10). 
No contract shipper appeared in support of the ap-
plicant, Pickering Transfer Company, Inc.,, nor was any 
contract offered disclosing the willingness of any person 
to contract with the proposed transferee, Pickering Trans-
fer Company, Inc. The only schedule of rates and charges 
received in evidence was a schedule of rates and charges 
filed with the Commission on December 23, 1974 naming 
rates and charges for the accounts of Campbell Soup 
Company and Industrial Supply Company. 
The only evidence offered concerning any service 
provided by Mary A. Murphy was the testimony of Max 
W. Young relating to cervice performed for Campbell 
Soup Company. Under oath, Mr. Young testified that 
said service was performed in intrastate commerce pur-
suant to contract motor carrier permit No. 130 (R. 163, 
164-172, 180-185). On April 16, 1973, Max W. Young 
filed an affidavit with the Commission correcting his tes-
timony of April 6, 1973 and disclaiming any intrastate 
service by Mary A. Murphy for the account of Campbell 
Soup Company for the year 1972 (R. 19-20). 
On December 3, 1973^ the protesting motor carriers 
filed their Petition to Reopen and for Further Hearing 
with the Commission. The petition was based, among 
other things, on a material change of circumstances re-
sulting from the decision in Case No. 12920 of this Count 
which interpreted the scope of Mary A. Murphy's con-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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tract carrier peanut {ix. zl--i- -v: ' muarv 31, 1974, 
the Commission ordered that sai«) pH<tM>n \*- sencd on 
all parties and that all partie- ii^SI?IL SO submit 
memorandums an*! 'mrf- to tiw Commission -a* or be-
fore Feibruary 15, 1 .^'}. with respect to said petition (R. 
25). Responsive documents were subsequently filed with 
the Commission bv counsel for plaintiffs and counsel 
for defendamts. 
On July 9, lift4, uit uommission served its Order 
granting the petition to reopen the proceeding and setting 
the date of July 26, 1974 for further hearing. On said 
date, the Commission heard argument tnm; counsel on 
both sides with mspoa u- * T.OIMII ^ lismiss the appli-
cation and the burden of pi-ool io IK »»O: !** M'»f appli-
cants. The Commissi,>n look admit * ira i * notice of 
the Supreme Con it ruling in Case No, 129'20. Subject 
to certain objections reserved by applicants' counsel, the 
parties stipulated that each of tiic protesting motor car-
riers could establish through testimony and documentary 
evidence that they had each made substantial invest-
ments in plant and equipment to serve the territory 
which is involved in the contract carrier permit of Mary 
A. Murphy; that each protectant depends upon traffic 
originating within that same area to support the remain-
ing territory served by each of tbem; and that if "the 
contract carrier permit of Mary A. Murphy were trans-
ferred, that each of the protesting motor carriers would 
'be materially and adversely affected (R. 222). The Com-
mission, subsequently took administrative notice of *"*• 
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annual reports of Mary A. Murphy and contracts filed 
through July 26, 1974 (R. 223). 
On October 30, 1974, the Commission issued its Re-
port and Order wherein it reviewed the entire record and 
the applicable law. In said Report and Order the Com-
mission concluded that the applicants had not met their 
burden of proof and that the transfer of the contract 
carrier permit from Mary A. Murphy to Pickering Trans-
fer Company, Inc. should be denied. The Commission 
went on to explain that it could not determine the fit-
ness and ability of the proposed transferee based on the 
record before it. Further, the Commission said that since 
there was no agreement between the transferror and 
the transferee, it could not deteirmine the value of the 
certificate apart from the value of the contract carrier 
permit and therefore could not separately transfer the 
certificate based on the record before it (R. 54-56). 
The applicants subsequently filed a petition for re-
hearing which was denied by the Commission on De-
cember 6, 1974 (R. 64). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COMMISSION PROPERLY DENIED 
THE PROPOSED TRANSFER OF THE CON-
TRACT CARRIER PERMIT OF MARY A. 
MURPHY TO PICKERING T R A N S F E R 
COMPANY, INC. BECAUSE THE APPLI-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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CAIN I D FAILED TO SATISFY THE MINI-
MUM STATUTORY AND REGULATORY 
REQUIREMENTS. 
In its decision "under date of October iM), II"! 174, Uie 
Commission concluded as follows: 
"Rule No. 2 [II] of the Motor Carrier Rules and 
Regulations effective June 1, 1937, which deals 
with certificates of public convenience and neces-
sity, together with case law expressly state and 
hold 'that a person desiring to assume the oper-
ating rights of someone else 'will not be re-
quired to prove public convenience and neces-
sity.' Rule No. 3 [III] of the Motor Carrier 
Rules and Regulations, which rule specifically 
deals with permits, expressly provides, 'the par-
son desiring to assume said operating rights shall 
comply with the provisions of Chapter 65, Laws 
of Utah, 1935, as in filing for a new permit/ We 
aire of the opinion that the Commission's rules, 
except where expressly modified, are still in 
full force and effect. In fact, the validity of said 
rules were not challenged and were expressly 
referred, to by the court 'in, the case of Murphy 
v. Public Service Commission of Utah, supra. 
Critical to the transfer of a contract carrier per-
mit is the introduction by applicant of evidence 
that the grant of the application will not be 
detrimental to the best interests of the people 
of the State of Utah and/or to the localities to 
be served. Additionally, applicants must dem-
onstrate that existing transportation facilities 
do not provide adequate or reasonable service. 
Applicants have not met their burden of proof 
and the transfer of the contract carrier permit 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
from Mary A. Murphy, dba Alex Pickering 
Transfer, to Pickering Transfer Company, Inc. 
should be denied" (R. 56). [Emphasis and 
bracketed information added.] 
The Commission properly concluded that the appli-
cants had not met their burden of proof in order to trans-
fer the contract carrier permit of Mary A. Murphy to 
Pickering Transfer Company, Inc. The record before the 
Commission is seriously deficient in two particular re-
spects in that the applicant did not demonstrate that 1) 
transfer of the contract carrier permit would not be det-
rimental to the best interests of the people of the State 
of Utah and/or the localities to be served and 2) that 
existing transporfcation facilities do not provide adequate 
or reasonable service. 
The Commission adhered to its Motor Carrier Rules 
and Regulations No. 3 issued June 1, 1937 in reaching 
its decision. The full text of these regulations is set 
forth as Exhibit 37 in the Special Record in this pro-
ceeding. The Commission is authorized to issue such 
regulations by virtue of Section 54-6-11, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, which provides: 
"Powers of commission. — The commission is 
hereby vested with power and authority and it 
may supervise and regulate every contract motor 
carrier in this state and fix and approve reason-
able maximum or minimum rates, fares, charges 
and classifications, and to adopt reasonable rules 
and regulations pertaining to all such motor car-
riers." 
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Rule No. HI of the Commission's Motor Carrier 
Rules and Regulations No. 3 governs the transfer of con-
tract carrier permits. The pertinent portions of Rule III 
provide as follows: 
"(d) In the event a person operating under 
a permit issued by the Commission enters into 
an agreement with another person to sell, assign, 
or transfer the operating rights covered by said 
permit the following procedure shall be followed 
before the Commission: 
"A joint application shall be filed by the persons 
involved which application shall request author-
ity for the one person to discontinue operations 
as a motor carrier and fcxr the other person to 
assume and take over said operations as a mo-
tor carrier. The person desiring to assume said 
operating rights shall comply with the provisions 
of Chapter 65, Laws of Utah, 1935, as in filing 
for a new permit." 
The applicable provision of Chapter 65 of the Laws 
of Utah, 1935, to which the regulation refers is Section 
9 which provides in part: 
"* * * The commission upon the filing of 
an application for a contract motor carrier's per-
mit by any other person than those referred to 
above in this section shall fix a time and place 
for hearing thereon and shall give the same no-
tice as provided in section 6 hereof. The com-
mission shall also subpoena a member of the 
state road commission to be present at said hear-
ing and said member or representative desig-
nated by said road commission shall offer testi-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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mony as to the character of the highway over 
which said contract motor carrier proposes to 
operate and the effect thereon; and upon the 
traveling public using the same. If, from all the 
testimony offered at said hearing, the commis-
sion shall determine that the highways over 
which the applicant desires to operate are not 
unduly burdened; that the granting of the appli-
cation will not unduly interfere with the travel-
ing public; and that the granting of the applica-
tion will not be detrimental to the best interest 
of the people of the state of Utah and/or to the 
localities to be served, the commission shall grant 
such permit; * * *." 
In order to understand the full meaning of Section 9, 
Chapter 65, Laws of Utah, 1935, it is necessary to examine 
the statutory history of the section in order to determine 
the criteria by which the Commission is to operate pur-
suant to its Rule III with respect to the transfer of con-
tract motor carrier permits. 
The predecessor statute to Section 9, Chapter 65, 
Laws of Utah, 1935, is Section 13, Chapter 53, Laws of 
Utah, 1933. Section 13 provides in pertinent part: 
"* * * Before granting a permit to a con-
tract motor carrier, the commission shall take 
into consideration the character of the highway 
over which said contract motor carrier proposes 
to operate, and the effect thereon, and upon the 
traveling public using the same and also other 
existing transportation facilities and whether or 
not there is any real necessity for the service 
proposed to be rendered, and if it appears from 
the evidence that the highway is, in the opinion 
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of the commission, already unduly burdened 
with traffic and that additional traffic will un-
duly interfere with the traveling public, or that 
the service furnished by the existing transporta-
tion facilities is reasonably adequate and that 
there is no real need for any additional trans-
portation facilities, the commission shall not 
grant such permit. * * *" 
Section 13, Chapter 53, Laws of Utah, 1933, contains an 
additional criterion not expressly found in Section 9, 
Chapter 65, Laws of Utah, 1935. That criterion is the 
adequacy of existing transportation facilities. However, 
as will be explained below, that criterion is necessarily 
implied in the best interests test found in Section 9, 
Chapter 65, Laws of Utah, 1935. 
Section 9, Chapter 65, Laws of Utah, 1935, was car-
ried forward into the Utah Code of 1943 as Section 76-5-
21 without change. 
In 1945, Section 76-5-21, Utah Code of 1943, was 
amended to expresly include the criterion of adequacy 
of existing transportation facilities, which criterion had 
apparently been inadvertently omitted from Section 9, 
Chapter 65, Laws of Utah, 1935, when Chapter 53, Laws 
of Utah, 1933, was revised. Section 76-5-21, Utah Code, 
1943, following amendment, read in pertinent part, as 
follows: 
«* * * rpjie CJOjm^ jggJQin upon the filing of an 
application for a contract motor carrier's permit 
shall fix a time and place for hearing thereon 
and may give the same notice as provided in sec-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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tion 76-5-18 hereof. If, from all the testimony 
offered at said hearing, the commission shall 
determine that the highways over which the 
applicant desires to operate are not unduly bur-
dened; that the granting of the application will 
not unduly interfere with the traveling public; 
and that the granting of the application will not 
be detrimental to the best interests of the peo-
ple of the state of Utah and/or to the localities 
to be served* and if the existing transportation 
facilities do not provide adequate or reasonable 
service, the commission shall grant such permit." 
Section 76-5-21, Utah Code, 1943 (as amended) was 
carried forward without change as Section 54-6-8, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953. 
Plaintiffs contend that the Commission erred in in-
corporaiting the adequacy of existing transportation facili-
ties test as a part of its decision. Plaintiffs contend that 
the Commission should have strictly applied its Rule 
III as the same refers literally to "Chapter 65, Laws of 
Utah, 1935, as in filing for a new permit." Plaintiffs' 
evidence was so inadequate that it did not even meet 
the requirements of Chapter 65, Laws of Utah, 1935. 
Regardless, the Commission properly applied the cur-
rent statutory criteria as the same are presently embod-
ied in Section 54-6-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
The Commission is an administrative body created 
by the Legislature to supervise and regulate, as here 
pertinent, the transportation of property by motor ve-
hicle within the State. Rowley v. Public Service Com-
mission, et al., 112 Utah 116, 122, 185 P. 2d 514 (1947). 
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As the servant of the Legislature, any rules and regula-
tions of the Commission must be in accord with and not 
exceed the bounds of the statutes from which its author-
ity is derived. While Rule III of the Commission's regu-
lations has not been amended since 1937, the body of 
law to which it makes reference, Chapter 65, Laws of
 f 
Utah, 1935, has been amended by the Legislature.The * 
United States Supreme Court has previously held that 
an administrative agency's interpretation of its own regu-
lation is controlling unless it is plainly erroneous or in-
consistent with the regulation. Immigration and Natural-
ization Service v. Stanisic, 395 U. S. 62, 23 L. Ed, 2d 101, 
89 S, Ct. 1519 (1969). While the regulation embodied 
in Rule III does not literally refer to the present under-
lying statute due to the fact that amendment of the 
regulations has not kept pace with amendment of the 
statutes, the Commission has placed an interpretation 
upon its own regulation that makes the same harmonious 
and consistent with the present body of statutory law. 
The intent of the regulation is plain on its face that any 
party proposing to acquire a contract motor carrier per-
mit by transfer should comply with the appropriate laws 
as though he were applying for a new permit. 
As noted above, statutory law prevails over related 
regulations in the event of an inconsistency. To do other-
wise, would frustrate the legislative intent. If, however, 
a mechanical approach to statutory construction is taken, 
as advocated by plaintiffs, the law still provides that the 
Commission's regulations must incorporate the current 
statutory criteria. 
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When a regulation is legislative in character, the 
rules of interpretation applicable to statutes should be 
used in determining the meaning of the regulation. Suth-
erland Statutory Construction, 4th Ed., Vol. 1A, Section 
31.06—"Administrative Regulations^—Interpretation". In 
State of North Dakota, ex rel. Public Service Commis-
mission v. Montana-Dakota Utilities Co., (N. D. 1958), 
89 N. W. 2d 94, the court was faced with two inconsistent 
statutes dealing with procedure on utility rate increases. 
The court there said: 
" 'When a subsequent enactment covering a field 
of operation coterminous with a prior statute 
cannot by any reasonable constmction be given 
effect while the prior law remains in operative 
existence because of irreconcilable conflict be-
tween the two acts, the latest legislative expres-
sion prevails, and the prior law yields to the ex-
tent of the conflict/ Sutherland Statutory Con-
struction, 3rd Ed., Sec. 2012. 
'The subsequent enactment of a statute which 
treats a phase of the same general subject mat-
ter in a more minute way consequently repeals 
pro tanto the provisions of the general statute 
with which it conflicts/ 
Sutherland Statutory Construction, 3rd Ed., Sec. 
2022; State ex rel. Lofthus v. Langer, 46 N. D. 
462, 177 N. W. 408; Hagstrom v. Estherville 
School Diet. No. 43, 67 N. D. 56, 269 N. W. 93." 
The section cited by the North Dakota court in Suther-
land Statutory Construction provides further that legis-
lative intent is the key to statutory interpretation and 
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Specifically, Rule III is now subject to Section 54-6-8 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 and not the 1935 laws. 
Where a conflict arises between a statute and a 
corresponding agency regulation, the statute must prevail in 
order that the legislative purpose will be accomplished. 
Sutherland Statutory Construction, 4th Edition, Volume 1A, 
Section 31.02-flAdministrative Regulations-Validity" provides: 
"Since the central legislative body is the 
source of an administrative agency's power, 
the provisions of the statute will prevail 
in any case of conflict between a statute 
and an agency regulation." County of Los 
Angeles v. State Department of Public 
Health, 158 Cal. App. 2d 425, 3?T~P~2d 
968 (1958). 
In applying its Rule III to transfers of contract 
motor carrier permits, the Commission must look to fulfill 
the legislative purpose and in doing so must consequently apply 
the criteria as presently set forth in Section 54-6-8 
Utah Code Annotated 1953. An administrative agency must 
look to the statute for its obvious purpose and that purpose 
is not to be overcome by resort to mechanical rules of 
construction. Rucker v. Wabash Railroad Company, 418 F. 2d 
146 (1969); Rowley v. Public Service Commission et al,, supra, 
at 112 Utah 121. 
In interpreting the Commission's regulation as 
embodied in Rule III, the meaning of the regulation is best 
determined from the Commission itself. In Barton Truck Line, 
Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 21 Utah 2d 102, 440 P. 2d 
972 (1968), this court said at 21 Utah 2d 105: 
"The one most likely to know what was meant 
by a given expression is the one who made 
it. The Public Service Commission used the 
language, and it should know better than 
anyone else what was meant." 
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thait counts must strive to satisfy that intent in applying 
rules of statutory construction. 
Crawford, Statutory Construction — Interpretation 
of Laws, Section 303, provides: 
"Since an amendment becomes a part of the 
original statute, both must be ronstrued together 
as if they constituted one enactment, even if 
the amendment occurs merely by implication* 
Their provisions should be harmonized, if possi-
ble, but where there is irreconcilable awiflict, 
the provisions of the amendemeot must prevail 
over those of the original statute on the theory 
that the former constitutes the last expression 
of the will of the legislature." 
Section 304 of the same treatise provides: 
"The amended statute should also be construed 
as if it had been originally passed in its amended 
form, since the amendment becomes a part of 
the original enactment. * * *" 
In New York, Chicago and St. Louis Railroad Com-
pany v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Engine-
men, 358 F. 2d 464 (1966), the court was faced with a 
labor dispute in which the Norris-LaGuarclia Act and 
a subsequent public law were inconsistent. There the 
court stated: 
"A specific act of the nature of Public Law 88-
108 is generally held to amend by implication 
any preceding general statute of the nature of 
the Norris-LaGuardia Act (29 U. S. C. §101) in 
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conflict therewith. Brotherhood of Railroad 
Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana Rail-
road Co., 363 U. S. 30, 41-42, 77 S. Ot. 635, 1 
L. Ed. 2d 622 (1957); Virginian Railway v. Sys-
tem Federation No. 40, 300 U. S. 515, 563, 57 
S. Ct. 502, 81 L. Ed. 789 (1937)." 
In Petition for Naturalization of Mirzoeff, 143 F. 
Supp. 177 (1956), the court interpreted three statutes 
enacted at different times dealing with the same subject 
matter. The latest statute to be enacted, similar to the 
instant situation, added a new requirement as well as 
adopting the substance of the prior law. There the court 
said:: 
"* * * The three statutes cover the same 
subject matter. Thus, to the extent that the 
1952 statute adds a new requirement it impliedly 
amends the earlier statutes. * * *" 
In the instant matter, the Commission's Rule III 
makes reference to the provisions of Chapter 65, Laws of 
Utah, 1953. The reference made is thus to a general body 
of law and not to a specific statute, although specific 
statutes within Chapter 65 govern the transfer of contract 
motor carrier permits. In Somermeier v. District Direc-
tor of Customs, 448 F. 2d 1243 (1971), the court was 
confronted with a situation where the California law 
adopted the appropriate provisions of federal law by 
reference. The issue was whether the court should apply 
the federal law at the time the California statute was 
enacted or the federal law as it was subsequently changed. 
There the court said: 
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Under California law, when, by statute, refer-
ence is made to general law rather than to a 
specific statute, the adopted laws are taken not 
only in their contemporary form but also as they 
may be changed from time to time. * * *" 
The statutory history of the subject Utah legisla-
tion, as set forth above, indicates that in 1933 adequacy 
of existing transportation facilities was one of several 
criteria that the Commission was to consider in granting 
or transferring contract motor carrier permits. In the 
1935 revisions of this body of law, this criterion was 
apparently inadvertently omitted because the same was 
reinstituted by the Legislature in 1945 and has been car-
ried forward into subsequent Utah statutes. In Jefferson 
County Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Education of Jeffer-
son County, (Ky., 1971), 463 S. W. 2d 627, Cert, den., 
404 U. S. 865, the court was faced with a situation re-
markably similar to the Utah statutory history in the 
instant matter. The Kentucky case was concerned with 
the right of teachers to strike. In 1940, the Kentucky 
Legislature enacted a statute governing employer-em-
ployee relations. The 1940 act set forth the right to col-
lectively bargain, strike and so forth, but the 1940 act 
contained an express exclusion relating to employees of 
federal and state bodies and political subdivisions and 
agenciese. In 1942 the Kentucky statutes were completely 
revised and the subject exclusion was carried forward 
into certain statutory provisions governing wages and 
hours but not into the subject Department of Labor stat-
ute. The court there held that the legislative policy had 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
been expressed in the earlier 1940 act and that the ex-
clusion with respect to strikes by public employees must 
be read into the subsequent "Department of Labor" 
statute. There the court said at page 629: 
"The original Act pertaining to employer-em-
ployee relations clearly and expressly excluded 
public employees from the granted right to 
strike. The apparently inadvertent omission of 
this exclusion in Chapter 336 when the statutes 
were revised cannot be held to have changed 
the legislative policy and the law. Therefore 
appellants cannot properly claim the legislature 
has granted them such right, and their principal 
contention must fell." 
In the instant matter, not only was the legislative 
policy with respect to the adequacy of existing transpor-
tation facilities expressed in 1933, but when the omission 
was discovered, the Legislature took pains to correct the 
omission in 1945 and carried the corrected statute for-
ward into the 1953 Code. Clearly, the criteria to be con-
sidered by the Commission in applying its Rule III with 
respect to the transfer of contract carrier permits is the 
legislative policy as set forth in the 1953 Utah Code, 
which latter Code contains the same basic criteria as 
originally established by the Utah Legislature in 1933. 
To do otherwise, would do violence to the legislative in-
tent which is clearly expressed and would contravene 
existing case law. The Commission properly applied its 
regulations and the law to the case before it. 
In its decision, the Commission also concluded that 
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the plaintiffs did not meet their burden of proof with 
respect to demonstrating that "the grant of the applica-
tion will not be detrimental to the best interests of the 
people of the State of Utah and/or to the localities to be 
served" (R. 56). This criterion necessarily embodies an 
examination of the adequacy of existing transportation 
facilities. In 1933,, the Legislature set forth the purpose 
of its act. Section 34, Chapter 53, Laws of Utah, 1933, 
provides: 
The business of operating as a motor carrier 
for hire along the highways of this state is de-
clared to be a business affected with the public 
interest. The rapid increase of motor carrier 
traffic, and the fact that under existing law many 
motor vehicles are not effectively regulated, have 
increased the dangers and hazards on public 
highways and make it imperative that more 
stringent regulation should be employed, to the 
end that the highways may be rendered safer 
for the use of the general public; that the wear 
of such highways may be reduced; that discrim-
ination in rates charged may be eliminated; that 
the use of the highways for the transportation by 
motor vehicles for hire may be restricted to the 
extent required by the necessity of the general 
public, and that the various transportation agen-
cies of the state may be adjusted and correlated 
so that public highways may serve the best in-
terest of the general public" (Emphasis added.) 
Through Section 34 the Legislature has indicated that 
the best interests of the people of the State of Utah 
and/or the localities to be served necessarily incorpor-
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ates the existing transportation industry as well as high-
way utilization by all public sectors. In the hearing on 
July 26, 1974, the parties stipulated that the protesting 
motor carriers who constitute the substantial part of the 
motor carrier industry within the area authorized to be 
served by Mary A. Murphy would be materially and 
adversely affected if Mary A. Murphy's contract motor 
carrier permit were transferred. The harm to be en-
countered by transfer of the permit was established in 
the record and perceived by the Commission. This was 
a necessary element in its decision in concluding that 
transfer of the permit was not in the best interests of 
the people of the State of Utah and/or the localities to 
be served. 
The plaintiffs suggest that the court should consider 
the rationale set forth in Collett, et al. v. Public Service 
Commission, et al., 116 Utah 413, 211 P. 2d 195 (1949), 
and Morris v. Public Service Commission, 7 Utah 2d 167, 
321 P. 2d 644 (1958). Plaintiffs admit that the operating 
authority transferred in those cases in each instance was 
a certificate of public convenience and necessity of a 
common motor carrier and in no way involved contract 
motor carrier permits. Plaintiffs urge that logic com-
pels that the rule relating to transfer of common motor 
carrier certificates be applied to the transfer of contract 
motor carrier permits. They do this even though the 
Commission's rules are directly to the contrary. 
The Commission has historically recognized the dis-
tinction between common and contract motor carriers 
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and has provided separate sets of rules to govern the 
transfer of their authorities. Rule III of the Commission 
as discussed above sets forth the criteria for the transfer 
of contract motor carrier permits. The regulation govern-
ing the transfer of common motor carrier certificates is 
set forth in the Commission's Motor Carrier Rules and 
Regulations No. 3 as its Rule II. The burden of proof 
with respect to the two types of motor carriers is sub-
stantially different. Rule II provides in pertinent part: 
"A joint application shall be filed by the persons 
involved which application shall request author-
ity for the one person to discontinue operations 
as a motor carrier and for the other person to 
assume and take over said operations as a motor 
carrier. The person desiring to assume said oper-
ating rights shall comply with the provisions of 
Chapter 65, Laws of Utah, 1935, as in filing for 
a ne wcertificate of convenience and necessity 
except that said person will not be required to 
prove convenience and necessity." (Emphasis 
added.) 
The distinction between common and contract mo-
tor carriers has historically been recognized by the Com-
mission and also by this court. In Rio Grande Motor 
Way, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 21 Utah 2d 377, 
445 P. 2d 990 (1968), this court said at 21 Utah 2d 380: 
"The first comprehensive act was passed by the 
legislature in 1933 (Chap. 53, S. L. U. 1933). 
Article II thereof relates to the issuance of cer-
tificates of convenience and necessity and the 
regulation of cojnmon motor carriers; while Arti-
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cle III deals separately with contract motor car-
riers and the issuance of operating permits to 
them. This separate recognition and treatment 
of these different types of service has been con-
tinued in all subsequent enactments. * * *" 
Also see McCarthy, et al. v. Public Service Commission, 
et al., 111 Utah 489, 184 P. 2d 220 (1947), at 111 Utah 
494. Different standards must be applied to contract 
motor carriers than common motor carriers because of 
the differing types of service performed by them. The 
distinguishing characteristic of the common carrier is 
that it transports for all persons who request such service 
where as the contract carrier renders a transportation 
service only to specific parties with whom it has con-
tracts to do so. Realty Purchasing Company v. Public 
Service Commission, 9 Utah 2d 375, 345 P. 2d 606 (1959). 
Because the contract motor carrier serves only those 
with whom it has contracts, the Commission must be 
in a position to determine whether or not the transfer 
of the permit is supported by the contracting shippers 
and whether the transfer is in the public interest. The 
rationale for requiring a different burden of proof from 
the contract motor carrier than the common motor car-
rier is set forth in Ratner—Control; Emery Transporta-
tion Co.—Purchase—Gordon, 57 M. C. C. 385 (1951). 
In the Ratner case, Emery Transportation Company, a 
contract motor carrier, sought to purchase the operating 
authority of Lawrence Gordon, also a contract motor 
carrier. The Commission denied the proposed transfer 
of the permit and at page 393 stated its rationale: 
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"In Baggett Transp. Co.—Purchase—De Tar 
Distributing Co., 56 M. C. C. 563, where the 
vendor, a contract carrier, had discontinued ser-
vice, we stated: 
The traffic formerly transported by vendor has 
been absorbed, in part, by competing carriers, 
with the remainder being transported by the 
shipper for its own account as a private carrier. 
There is no evidence of record that any shipper 
has expressed a need for the service proposed by 
vendee, that existing service in vendor's terri-
tory is inadequate or unsatisfactory, or that ex-
isting carriers could not, if called upon to do so, 
absorb the traffic now being transported by At-
las in private carriage. Theire is no evidence 
showing that vendor's discontinuance of opera-
tions has in any way inconvenienced its shipper, 
or other shippers formerly served by it. The con-
clusion is warranted that present carriers are 
satisfactorily meeting the shipper's needs for 
contract-carrier service. The circumstance that 
vendor's discontinuance of service occurred with-
out the knowledge or consent of vender, has no 
bearing on the question whether the purchase 
would be consistent with the public interest. 
The facts here are similar to those in numerous 
other proceedings where it has been found that 
it would not be consistent with the public in-
terest to permit the acquisition and reinstitu-
tvon of common-carrier operations, which had 
been discontinued by the vendor, in the absence 
of evidence indicating a need for resumption 
of service. Fish Transport Co., Inc.—Purchase 
Aiello, 50 M. C. C. 729. The fact that contract-
carrier rights are involved here does not, of it-
self, warrant approval in the absence of similar 
evidence. 
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"Gordon, as indicated, served only one shipper, 
Food Fair Stores, In. The traffic which he for-
merly handled for that concern is now trans-
ported partly in private carriage by the shipper 
and partly in common carriage by certain motor-
carrier protestants. The transaction involves the 
purchase of bare operating rights, with no going-
concern value or good will. Gordon has ceased 
to be a competitiue factor. * * *" (Empha-
sis added.) 
In keeping within the present body of statutory law, 
the Commission properly concluded: 
"* * * Critical to the transfer of a contract 
carrier permit is the introduction by applicant 
of evidence that the grant of the application will 
not be detrimental to the best interests of the 
people of the State of Utah and/or to the locali-
ties to be served. Additionally, applicants must 
demonstrate that existing transportation facili-
ties do not provide adequate or reasonable ser-
vice. Applicants have not met their burden of 
proof and the transfer of the contract carrier 
permit from Mary A. Murphy, dba Alex Pick-
ering Transfer, to Pickering Transfer Company, 
Inc., should be denied." (Vol. 1, p. 56.) 
POINT II. 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO ESTAB-
LISH THE NATURE OF THE TRANSAC-
TION UNDERLYING THE APPLICATION 
AND THE PROPOSED TRANSFEREE HAS 
FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE ITS FITNESS 
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AND ABILITY TO CONDUCT THE OPER-
ATION. 
The Commission concluded in its Order under date 
of October 30, 1974, that the transferee had not estab-
lished that it was ready, willing and able to operate the 
certificate and permit which it proposed to acquire from 
Mary A. Murphy. The Commission also concluded that 
there was no agreement between the transferor and the 
transferee pursuant to which it could find that the terms 
of the proposed transaction were consistent with the 
public interest (R. 56). 
In a transfer proceeding, the proposed transferee 
must establish that it has the financial ability, exper-
ience, and capability to carry on the business of the 
transferror and that it is fit to do so. In the instant mat-
ter, all the financial data submitted by the transferee was 
that of the transferror, although it was stipulated by 
protestants that certain aspects of that data could be 
considered the pro forma statements of the transferee 
(R. 197). No actual financial data was ever presented 
on behalf of the transferee. The fitness of the proposed 
transferee was placed in issue and not satisfactorily ex-
plained by the transferee (R. 185-186). 
No contract was offered in evidence demonstrating 
that any agreement had been reached between the trans-
ferror and the transferee. The only agreement offered 
was a contract of purchase between Max W. Young and 
Mary A. Murphy, which contract was identified as Ex-
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hibit 4 (R. 5-10). Exhibit 4 also raised the issue of the 
real party in interest and whether the plaintiff, Pickering 
Transfer Company, Inc. was in fact the proposed trans-
feree. That issue was not resolved on the record. 
The Commission had no evidence before it whatso-
ever from which it could conclude that the applicant had 
the financial ability, experience, fitness and capability 
to carry on the business, if any, conducted by Mary A. 
Murphy. Further, there was no contract of purchase be-
tween the plaintiffs from which the Commission could 
ascertain the terms of their agreement, if any, and their 
intentions with respect to operating and financing the 
proposed business. 
CONCLUSION 
In the instant matter, the Commission properly ap-
plied its regulations and the law to exercise the responsi-
bility imposed on it by the Legislature. There is ample 
basis in the record to support the Commission's findings 
and conclusions and the Commission's action is not arbi-
trary or capricious. It is a wise decision supported by 
the record and should be sustained. 
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